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fL. A. No. 20897. In Bank. Yay 2, 1950.1 
A. G. (a Corporation), Appellant, Y. 
SEYMOUR NEBENZAL et al., Respondents. 
[1] Oontracts-Interpretation-Function of Oourts.-An appellate 
court will adhere to the interpretation placed by the court on 
, the writings and conduct of the parties with respect to the 
uhlbition of a French motion picture, where such interpreta-
tion is supported by the evidence. 
Literary Property-Contracts.-Where a corporation sold to 
defendant its English remake rights in a French motion picture 
based on a novel, reserving the right to exploit the original 
-French version in such language, and also granted defendant 
. - option to purchase the corporation's French rights iIi the 
. original material. defendant performed his contractual obliga-
. tions to the corporation by paying it the designated SUlD for 
the remake rights, and he was as free as any other would-be 
.i.purchaser to negotiate with the person who had acquired the 
.lieenie or "extension" of the French rights beyond the period 
'~., was required to exercise the option. 
. of Corporate Entity.-PlaintUr waa-
prejudiced by a finding that defendant corporation wu 
the al'". ego of defendant stockholder wliere the court's 
'_.-,-,--~ that plaintifr had failed ~o establish fraud or injustice 
of the stockholder was supported by the evidence. 
Disregarding the corporate existenee, notes, 1 A.L.B. 610; 
,.. ___ .. 597. See, also, 6A OaLJur. 75; 13 Am.Jur. 160 . 
. Die. References: [1] Contracts, 1161; [2,4, 6] Literar,y 
iiWIi.m.t!. [3] Corporations, 15. 
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[4] Litera17 Property-Appeal-Harmless Error.-A finding that 
defendant stockholder assigned to defendant corporation cer· 
tain rights in a French motion picture based on a novel which 
he had purchased from plaintift', and that the corporation 
reassigned such rights to the stockholder, was not prejudicial 
to plaintift' in view of the tlnding against fraud and injustice 
Oil the stockholder's part. 
[6] Id.-Findings and Judgment.-Where plaintift' corporatioll 
alleged in its complaint to restrain interference with exhibition 
of its motion picture that it was the "owner of the world-
wide" rights to a French motion picture based on a novel, and 
defendants denied the allegation, the court correctly defined 
those rights according to the findings by including in the judg-
ment a statement that ever since a named date the corporation 
did not have the right to distribute, exploit or exhibit the 
picture anywhere in the world. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Loa 
Angeles County. Clarence L. Kincaid, JUdge. Judgment 
affirmed. 
Action for injunctive relief and for damages. Judgment for 
defendants affirmed. 
Herzbrun & Chantry and David Mellinkoft for Appellant. 
Fred Horowitz for Respondents. 
SCHAUER, J.-In 1946 defendants began suit in a French 
court to prevent plaintiff from further exhibiting the French 
language motion picture "Mayerling/' Plaintiff thereupon 
instituted this suit for an injunction against interference with 
exhibItion of the picture and against prosecution of the French 
suit, and for damages; and from an adverse judgment has 
taken this appeal. We have concluded that the decision of the 
trial court (sitting without a jury) that plaintiff's right to 
exhibit the picture expired in October, 1945, and that plainti1f 
is entitled to no recovery in this suit, must be upheld. 
Resolution of the controversy turns upon the interpretation, 
with the aid of parol evidence, of two written contracts entered 
into between the parties hereto in 1944. In the discussion 
which follows the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable 
to defendants (respondents). as is required on appeal. 
Plaintiff is a corporation formed under the laws of Switzer-
land. Defendants are Seymour Nebenzal and Nero Fi1ms~ 
Inc., a California corporation of which Nebenzal is a atock· 
) 
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holder, a director, and the president; unless otherwise indi-
cated, however, the designation "defendant" will hereinafter 
refer to Nebenzal only. Also, unless otherwise stated" Mayer-
ling" will refer to the French language picture involved in 
this litigation. 
" Nebenzal has been in the motion picture business in Ger-
, many, France and the United States for some 25 years. In 
'1935 he produced Mayerling in France for the Concordia 
'~'Company, the stock of which was owned by Nebenzal, Emile 
: Natan, and Chiel Weissman. The picture in the French lan-
:(; goage stars Charles Boyer and Danielle Darrieux, and is 
'''the story of Crown Prince Rudolph of Austria who in 1889 
~'eomlID.i,tte,d suicide." It is based approximately 95 per cent 
historical matter in the publie domain and upon "certain 
~',~eatur~~ original to the script expressly written for the pic-
" and 5 per cent upon original material (hereinafter 
~;tAmJled the" Anet material") taken from a novel also entitled 
authored by the late Claude Anet. The Anet 
,t ..... t,I>?1,.l was used pursuant to a five-year license (hereinafter 
,"liIIn-U£CU the "Anet rights"), due to expire in October, 1940, 
from the author or his heirs. The picture was 
~:reileased in 1935 or 1936. 
'f'}" .... ,.Df'f" .. Nebenzal disposed of his interest in the Concordia 
tj,(>D1]~8Ilry" the company was liquidated, and plaintiff became 
of Mayerling. In 1940 Natan secured an extension 
Anet rights for a five-year period expiring October 8, 
.. lacking those rights the picture could not be shown 
11' ... ,"'1 ....... Anet material was eliminated. In 1942 Natan trans-
1;~lITeiQ his Anet rights to plaintiff. 
'.1943 Nebenzal, then in America, inquired by mail ef 
. M. Gmess, who was plaintiff's attorney-in-faet in 
concerning possible acquisition of remake rights 
..... ___ •• u_ After extended correspondence Gmess wrote 
in January, 1944, that he was authorized to sell the 
language remake rights for $20,000, that the Anet 
were extended to October, 1945, and that pJaintiff would 
to~ do its best to secure a further extension at Nebenzal'. 
In March, 1944, Gmess wrote Nebenzal that (be-
war) it was impossible to cable plaintiff in Switzer. 
have plaintiff contact the Anet heirs, as the territory 
occupied by the enemy. Because of the uncertainty 
--".,n~.... France would be liberated" and contact estab-
the Anet heirs Nebenzal informed Gruess that he 
) 
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wished to "separate myself from" the Anet rights and would 
eliminate Anet material from the intended remake of Mayer-
ling, thereby freeing himself from the necessity of securing 
an extension of the Anet rights in order to show the picture 
after October, 1945, and that the new picture would be based 
solely on historical material and on material original to the 
script of the French Mayerling. 
Thereafter by two contractsl (hereinafter termed the "main 
lThe contracts, 80 far 8.11 here material, provide as follows: Mai" 
ContrlJ(lt: 
" ••• Whereas, the Purchaser [Nebenzlll] does not desire to nse the 
features peculiar to the Claude Anet novel but base the story of the new 
production on historical facta, on features original with the script of the 
Motion Picture • • . and on such new features as he may deem At to 
introduce ••. 
" FIBST: For Value received the Owner [plaintiff] hereby sella, 
assigns, quitclaims and granta to the Purchaser all the Owner's rights in 
and to the Motion Picture to the extent that it owns those rights itself, 
including the right to make and produce a motion picture in Engliah based 
thereon, as well as the right to nse the title' MayerUng' ••• but exclud-
ing those rights expressly excepted and/or reserved herein, I'BoVIDED, 
however, that the right to nse the novel by Claude Anet or the name of 
the author thereof ill not being transferred. But nothing herein contained 
shall be deemed to prevent the Purchaser from using any material in eaid 
novel which may be in public domain and/or hilltorical in source _ .. 
"THIBD: [Nebenzal agreed not to exploit the new motion picture in 
ten Central European countries until three years after the ceasation of 
hostilities therein.] . .. 
"FIFTH: The unqualified right of the Owner to exploit the original 
French version in the original French language under the title 'Mayer-
ling' ill hereby expressly reserved •.. 
" ELEVENTH: It ill agreed that all questions arilling on a disagree-
ment, including all questions relating to the construction, performance 
and enforcement thereof, shall be determined in accordance with the lawa 
of the State of New York •.• " 
Option 4grtl6merat: 
The option agreement recites execution of the main contract, and thea 
provides that in consideration of One Dollar it ill agreed that: 
•• FIRST: In case the Purchaser should, in the future, for any rea8OJI. 
whatever, desire to acquire the rights based on the Claude Anet novel. 
the Owner grants to the Purchaser the option to acquire those rights to 
the extent the Owner owns them. itself and for the time the Owner owna 
those rights ••• for the price of One Hundred .•• Dollan, 
"PROVIDED, the Purehaaer exercises the option ••• within three (a) 
months after the Armistice concluding the present war in Europe, how-
ever, at the latest by July 8, 1945. 
"SECOND: In the event the Purchaser should exercise the option, 
the Owner also agrees, upon expre88 request to be made by the Purchaser, 
to try to the best of the Owner's abilities to obtain an extension of the 
Claude Anet rights which • . . expire on October 8, 1945, for another five 
(5) years, provided that the Purchaser .•• furnishes the consideration 
to be paid the heirs of Claude Anet for that extension •• _ 
" THIBD: Under all circumstances, and without having to make any 
contribution to the price to be paid to the heirs • • • for the extension 
_ • • the Owner shall be entitled to the use and exploitation of the rights 
dealt with hereia tor its own purposes in aeeordanee with the 1'III8l'fttiou 
ma4e in the apeement Biped aimultaneonsl7 ••• " 
) 
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contract" and the "option agreement") dated July 25, 1944, 
but not delivered or effective until September, 1944, when 
the cash price of $20,000 was paid, plaintiff (acting through 
Grucss) sold to Nebenzal all of plaintiff's rights to Mayerling, 
includi.ng remake rights in English, but excepting the Anet 
. material and excepting plaintiff's right to exploit the French 
Mayerling; and also granted Nebenzal an option to purchase 
prior to July 8, 1945, plaintiff's Anet rights, and agreed to 
'assist Nebenzal in obtaining at his own expense an extension 
of the Anetrights beyond their expiration date of October 8, 
o. '1945. These are the two contracts differing interpretations 
which give rise to this litigation. 
. Nebenzal, who was not then seeking the Anet rights, did 
request the option agreement and when it was presented 
him personally by Gruess in New York on July 26 or 27, 
he pointed out to Gruess that •• I was not interested, for 
good reasons, that is why I had them [Anet rights] 
'elimi:na1;ed from the main contract, in which he was willing 
them to me, and I said I didn't want them. And he 
. • .. it doesn't cost you anything, you might as well 
them and if you want to take up the option you can take 
o. up; if you don't have to, you don't have to.' . . . I said 
• . I have no intention of using the Claude Anet rights in 
remake of the picture.' He insisted, however, it might be 
"'''''._ . .L.' so I signed it in view of the fact it was an option, it 
mean anything to me. I had no intentions of picking up 
... [A]s it was an option, which I felt I could 
or not pick up, I accepted . . ." Nebenzal did not 
n~~cule the option and did not request plaintiff to secure an 
of the Anet rights. I Subsequently Nebenzal con-
an additional sum of $7500 to obtain a release to him-
Mayerling from the United States Office of Alien Prop-
which agency was then claiming title to the picture. 
September, 1944, one Marcel Hellman, of London, who 
Ii friend of Nebenzal and of Natan, arrived in New York, 
he learned of Nebenzal's intention to remake Mayer-
. Hellnian then proceeded to Hollywood, where in October, 
.0 he and Nebenzal discussed Mayerling and the Anet 
o Nebenzal told Hellman of Nebenzal's acquisition from 
of the remake rights to Mayerling and showed Hell-
Cft['LB.]:n recitals set forth in the main agreement between 
and Nebenzal stating that the Anet rights had been 
to plaintiff for the period expiring October 8, 
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1945; and Hellman stated that be had negotiated through his 
lawyer in Paris for an option to himself acquire motion pic-
ture rights in the Anet material for a five or seven year term 
beyond October, 1945, as he also intended to remake Mayerling ; 
Hellman's proposed option had no connection with the Anet 
rights formerly held by Natan, which expired in October, 
1945. While Hellman was still in Los Angeles he promised 
to assign to Nebenzal without profit to himself, Hellman (i.e., 
at Hellman's cost price of between $1,000 and $2,000), the 
license for Anet rights beyond October, 1945, but stated that 
he wanted Nebenzal to pay an additional sum of money there-
for to Natan, who "was coming back from the waI:s"; after 
further discussion Nebenzal agreed to pay Hellman's costs 
and to give Natan $2,000. Subsequently, while in New York 
en route to London, Hellman promised Nebenzal's lawyer to 
make the assignment of his Anet rights to Nebenzal "without 
any benefit or profit" to Hellman as soon 88 Hellman reached 
London and .. received the documents." 
Hellman returned to Europe, learned that the Anet heirs 
bad declined to grant the option he sought but instead wished 
to sell outright a license to use the Anet material for a fixed 
term. He and Natan thereupon purchased in Hellman '8 
name, from the Anet heirs, for between $1,500 and $3,000, a 
license to use the Anet material for a period of ten years (to 
October 8, 1955), and (in about March, 1945) decided to ask 
Nebenzal $10,000 therefor. After some delay and objections to 
the price Nebenzal paid the $10,000 to Hellman'8 attorney in 
New York and on or about October 31, 1945, the assignment 
(dated July 9, 1945) of the Anet rights from Hellman to 
Nebenzal was consummated. Nebenzal, who had believed that 
he had acquired the Anet rigqts from Hellman in the fall of 
1944, had informed plaintiff's agent Gruess of the fact as he 
believed it in the early spring of 1945. 
In the spring of 1946 defendants "heard" that Mayerling 
was being shown in France or Alsace-Lorraine, and in the fall 
of that year they instituted suit in France to stop exhibition 
of the picture, on the theory that inasmuch as plaintiff's Anet 
license had expired and that all Anet rights to use such ma-
terial in any motion picture for the 10-year period had been 
independently acquired by defendants, plaintiff could no 
longer exhibit or "exploit" the French language Mayerling. 
In July, 1947, plaintiffs filed this suit, the purpose of which 
is, as stated hereinabove, 'to enjoin defendants from interfer-
ing with exhibition of the French picture and from further 
prosecuting the suit in France, and to recover damages. 
') 
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Plaintiff ('on tends that under the provisions of paragraph 
numbered FIFTH of the main agreement and that llllmberl'd 
THIRD in the option agreement it bad the right, a'i against 
Nebenzal. to continue exploiting Mayerling. Plaintiff asserts 
in tbis connection that the option agreement describes "the 
only manner in which the defendant Nebenzal might acquire 
the Anet rights," and alleges that Nebenzal "and bis agents, 
_ servants, and employees ... secretly, maliciously and frand-
- ulently " acquired the Anet license without telling plaintiff, 
and thereby rendered .. it impossible for plaintiff to secure 
an extension of the Anet rigbts as provided" in the option 
agreement "or at all." Plaintiff further argues, in effect, that 
the option agreement which ostensibly runs in favor of Neben-
:. sal in reality places upon Nebenzal a greater burden or oblilla-
. don than upon plaintiff; i.e., plaintiff was required only. upon 
: reqnest of Nebenzal, to "try to the best of" its "abilities" to 
C~cure extension of the Anet rights beyond October 8, 1945, 
;'whereas Nebenzal was absolutely obligated, if by his own 
--....... A'''''',..;a ... and at his own expense he acquired an Anet license, 
.. .,JU V ""- such license, or permission to operate under it, to 
The court, however, found contrary to plaintiff's allegations 
-secrecy, malice and fraud, and further found that neither 
nor any person acting for him c, did anything to 
1,NnaE!r it impossible for plaintiff to secure an extension of 
bet rights," and that "the plaintiff since October 8,1945, 
-- no right to distribute or exploit or exhibit . . . Mayerling 
ra"IV1IIrhp'l'P in thE' world." In an oral decision delivered at the 
~elnsion of the trial, the trial judge declared his view of 
evidence and of the contracts between the parties. as 
1'fil.1lnWR: By the main contract plaintiff "reserved to itself the 
to exploit the original French version of Mayerling, and 
-, it does not say so, it mnst be construed to be to the 
-that the plaintift' owned or continued to own those 
it is conceded by all concerned that the right to 
-. ..... un or exploit. as is the term used throughout here, a 
picture, ends in any country with the termination of 
pnlUl'll pT'll A I rights between the author and the producer 
this case, was October 8, 1945 .. . Now . . . all 
option agreement] amounted to was giving him 
an option to thE'ir [plaintiff's] Anet rights to 
8, 1945, if he desired to purchase them, and they agreed 
) 
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to use their best efforts to get an extension for him withol t 
additional cost t>xcepting the cost they were put to followin;.: 
that date. They didn't bind themselves to do anything in 
particular in that rt·gard excepting to use their best offict>s. 
"Now the efft>ct of all this, it seems to the Court, is that 
Quader-Kino expected, during this difficult war period, that 
at the conclusion of hostilities they would be able to readily 
get an extension of these Anet rights from the heirs of Claude 
Anet. They did not contemplate, apparently, that anyone 
else might negotiate for them, or, if they did, that they were 
not bound in any event under this option agreement to deliver 
anything additional in such a contingency. Had they desired 
to bind Nebenzal in the particular in which they have sought 
to construe these documents, they should have included in their 
contract some provision to the effect that he would look entirely 
to them and to no one else for any Anet rights extension, and 
that he waived any right he might have to such rights subse-
quent to October 8, 1945, excepting through them ... [T]he 
Court finds that there has been no fraud established in this 
case on the part of the defendants . . . And . . . finds that 
under the . . . option agreement . . . there is no requirement 
reserved whereby the defendant had to . . . refrain from pre-
venting the plaintiff from securing the extension of the Anet 
rights, or that inhibited the defendant from taking the steps 
which he did in this case." 
[1] It is apparent that the evidence hereinabove sum-
marized supports the court's decision and the written findings 
based thereon. As declared in Edwards v. Billow (1948), ::ll 
Cal.2d 350, 359 [188 P.2d 748] (see also cases cited therein), 
"Under such circumstances this court will adhere to the ill-
terpretation placed by tJie trial court on the writings and the 
eonduct of the parties." 
Plaintiff urges, however, that under New York law, whiC"'h 
was to control construction of the main agreement (see parfl-
graph number ELEVENTH), that agreement either imposed on 
Nebenzal an "express duty to permit plaintiff to continue tIle 
exhibition of 'Mayerling' beyond October 8, 1945," or else 
bound Nebenzal by an "implied covenant" not to interfere 
with plaintiff's acquisition of an extension of ABet rights and 
not to use his own independently acquired ABet license to 
prevent plaintiff from exploiting Mayerling. On this point 
lliaintiff relies first on a statement in Kirke La SheUe Co. v. 
Paul Armstrong Co. (1933), 263 N.Y. 79,87 [188 N.E. 163], 
\hat "In the last anlyaia those cases only appQr the principle 
) 
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that in every contract there is an implied covenant that 
neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of 
destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive 
the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract 
there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing," and upon statements from other cases to the effect that 
good faith and honest dealing are required between contracting 
• parties. [2] Here, however, plaintiff as the party who was 
; selling the Mayerlingremake rights received "the fruits of the 
contract" in the form of the $20,000 paid it by N ebenzal; 80 
far as Nebenzal's contractual obligations to plaintiff are con-
t- cerned Nebenzal had by such payment performed his part of 
! the contract and nothing further remained to be done. More. 
t over, as found by the trial court, there is no evidence of any 
\ but fair and honest dealing on his part. Certainly he had no 
l: obligation under the main contract-or under the option agree-
r ment either, for that matter-to sit idly by and do nothing 
\', when he was told in the fall of 1944 that Hellman had acquired 
? the license or "extension" of Anet rights beyond October 8, 
1945. He was as free as any other would-be purchaser of 
those rights to negotiate with Hellman to secure them. More-
over, as found by the trial court and as shown by the evidence, 
. he informed plaintiff's agent Gruess as early as the spring of 
1945 that he was acquiring the so-called "extension" or new 
1icense which Hellman had secured. , 
'Underhill v. Schenck (1924),238 N.Y. 7 [143 N.E. 773, 33 
ifi:~~.LI"'Lto. 303], also relied upon by plaintiff, involves facts and 
differing materially' from those in this case, and 
li;4\lbill!equelntly is not persuasive to plaintiff's view. Suffice it 
say that that action was between a licensor and a licensee, 
. were to share jointly in the profits of a stage production, 
did not involve an outright cash sale such as that from 
ffaintiff to Nebenzal. 
Plaintiff further urges that attempts admittedly made 
:Nebenzal, subsequent to the exccution of the two contracts 
involved, to purchase from plaintiff all of its rights in 
. French Mayerling, amounted to a practical construction 
contracts by the parties and a concession by Nebenzal 
. plaintiff still continued to possess the right to exploit 
even after plaintiff's Anet rights expired in Octo-
However, Nebenzal testified that his efforts in this 
which failed because of lack. of agreement on the 
be paid, were for the purpose of acquiring the French 
. and prints and of removinc "from circulation en-
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tirely the old Mayerling . . . In my negotiations with Mary 
Pickford, . . . my negotiations before that and after that 
with Selznick and others, I found that it was most desirable to 
have the old negative and old prints, and that is, in fact, 
customary in the industry, that when a remake of an old 
picture is contemplated, that the major studios do not like to 
see prints or negatives of the former picture around if it can 
be avoided. This is customary to such an extent that in every 
sales contract when you grant a license to a buyer for a limited 
period of time there is always included a paragraph whereby 
the license holder is obliged to return to you the prints which 
he is holding, at the expiration of the license period. Also 
negatives if he should have any, original or dupe negatives." 
Any conflict in the evidence on this point was resolved in 
defendant's favor by the trial court, whose determination in 
this respect is conclusive on appeal. . 
[3] PlaintiiI attacks a finding by the trial court that de-
fendant Nero Films, Inc., is not the alter ego of defendant 
Nebenzal. However, plaintiff concedes in its brief that the 
court so found "Since the doctrine of alter ego arises only to 
prevent fraud or injustice, and the trial court felt there was 
neither." Inasmuch as the court's finding that plaintiff had 
failed to establish fraud or injustice is supported by the evi-
dence, it is obvious that plaintiff is not prejudiced by the find-
ing of which it complains. 
[4] Plaintiff next urges that a finding that Nebenzal as-
signed to defendant Nero Films, Inc., the Mayerling remake 
and the Anet rights, and that Nero Films, Inc. reassigned to 
Nebenzal, is not supported by the evidence. In view of the 
finding against fraud and injustice on Nebenzal's part it is 
apparent that this finding likewise is not prejudicial to plain-
tiff. However, the record reveals both oral and documentary 
evidence unnecessary to relate here which support it. There 
is an obvious clerical error in another finding (No. XI), in 
which the phrase "which the defendant had advised the de-
fendant" was meant to read "which Hellman had advised the 
defendant, It but it furnishes no ground for reversal. 
[5] Finally, plaintiff contends that the court erred in in-
clnding in the judgment a statement "That ever since Octo-
b('r 8, 1945, the plaintiff, Quader-Kino A.G., a corporation, 
did not have and doe~ not now have any right to distribute, 
exploit or exhibit the motion picture Mayerling anywhere in 
the world." Plaintiff in its complaint alleged that it is 
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ants denied the allegation. In order to completely determine 
the rights of the parties the court by its judgment correctly 
defined those rights according to the findings. (See Q'Melia 
v. Adkins (1946), 73 Cal.App.2d 143, 148 [166 P.2d 298).) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-I cannot agree that the eon-
tracts between Quader-Kin() and NebenzaJ do not give Quader-
Kino the right to enjoin Nebenzal's interference with the ex-
ploitation of their motion picture. 
Defendant Nebenzal acquired by purchase the right to pro-
duce a remake of plaintiff's "Mayerling" in English. To get 
that right Nebeozal had to pay $20,000 and to agree not only 
that plaintiff retained "the unqua1i1ied right" to exploit its 
original French version of "Mayerling" without restriction 
as to time, but also that Nebenzal's remake would not compete 
with the French version in certain countries until three years 
after the cessation of hostilities. These conditions in plain 
language assured plaintiff the right to continue the exploita-
tion of "Mayerling" without interference from Nebenzal. 
It Nebenzal now attempts to prevent that exploitation not-
~Withstanding that his promise not to interfere therewith was 
part of the consideration for the sale of the remake rights. 
,Defendant seeks to justify bis action on the ground that he 
liow owns the Anet rights on which 5'per cent of "Mayer-
ling" is based and that, since the Anet heirs or any third per-
IliOn acquiring the rights could prevent the exhibition of the 
;picture 80 long as it incorporates the Anet material, Nebenzal . 
~1 also prevent its exhibition. So far as Nebenzal is eon-
perned, howeve~, his ownership of the Anet rights is imma-r-' The .......... tion of the "unqualliled right" to which 
" ,ebenzal agreed does not admit of the qualification "if Quader-
i' 0 acquires an extension qf the Anet rights before Nebeozal 
~t.s them to it." As between Nebenzal and Quader-Kino, 
~e latter's reserved right was "unqua1i1ied," as the contract 
)tatecL 
It Upon the granting of the remake rights to Nebenzal the 
!JOlt serious threat to plaintiff's exploitation of its picture F5rU',",-',., . tha, t of competition or interference from Nebenzal. It ,~etefore demanded and received from Nebenzal contractual ~, 'cea that he would not interfere with the exhibitioll ef 
~/L,.~ 
) 
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"Mayerling" at any time and would not compete with it in 
certain countries. It was entitled to rely on those assurances. 
Another risk confronting plainti1i was the possibility of its 
not securing an~xtension of the Anet rights. War conditions 
made it impossible to secure that extension at the time the 
contracts were ~xecuted, but Quader-Kino was justifiably con-
vinced that it could secure the extension when communication 
with occupied Europe was reestablished. The rights were 
excluded from the grant of the remake rights but ",ere cov-
ered by a simultaneously executed supplemental agreement. 
Nebenzal was given the option to acquire "those rights to the 
extent the Owner [Quader-Kino] owns them itself" and it 
was agreed that if he exercised the option Quader-Kino would 
use its best efforts to secure their extension. The supplemental 
agreement makes it plain that if Nebenzal purchased the Anet 
rights "to the extent the owner owns them himself" or if 
plaintiff acquired an extension of the rights for Nebenzal, 
they were to be held for their mutual benefit. "Under all 
circumstances, and without having to make any contribution 
to the price to be paid to the heirs of Claude Anet for the 
extension of the rights, ( Quader-Kino] shall be entitled to 
the use and exploitation of the rights dealt with herein for 
its own purposes in accordance with the reservations made in 
the agreement signed simultaneously .. and those reservations 
are hereby expressly made part of this agreement." -It is 
true that Nebenzal did not agree not to purchase the rights 
independently. He knew. however, that the Anet rights would 
soon expire and that plainti1i's reservation of the unqualified 
right to exploit the picture and the limitation on the exhibi-
tion of the English remake would be valueless to plaintiff un-
-, --less an extension -of the Anet rights was obtained. 
The n~otiations for the Sale of the remake rights were 
begun when Hitler's European fortress had been dented only 
at Salerno and the cessation of hostilities seemed remote. 
When the contracts were executed the Allied armies were still 
contained in the Cherbourg Peninsula and had not penetrated 
farther east thim St. Lo. It would have been absurd at that 
time to contract so carefully about rights that would expire _ 
shortly and would have no value before their expiration. 
The Anet rights at that time had only 14 months to rnn. 
The exhibition of "Mayerling" in continental Europe before 
October 8, 1945, was virtually impossible. It is hardly con-
ceivable that plaintiff would have insisted on reserving rights 
that would be virtually useless to it. The contr~ have 
.) 
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· meaning only if they are construed as providing for the 
· acquisition of the Anet rights for the mutual benefit of Quader-
" Kino and Nebenzal. 
The supplemental agreement was based on the understand-
ing that Quader-Kino would eventually secure an extension 
of the Anet rights. Nebenzal was given the opportunity to 
share in those rights by paying the costs that Quader-I{ino 
would incur in their acquisition. Nebenzal in turn agreed 
that "Under all circumstances, and without having to make 
any contribution to the price to be paid to the heirs of Claude 
Anet for the extension of the rights," Quader-Kino would be 
entitled to their concurrent use. These mutual obligations 
are clear even without express words of promise. (Atwater If 
Co. v. Panama R. R. Co., 246 N.Y. 519, 524 [159 N.E. 418).) 
. Although it is true that Nebenzal did not expressly agree not 
to purchase the rights independently and use them to prevent 
plaintiff's exploitation of its picture, "we think .. ' . that 
• luch a promise is fairly to be implied. The law has outgrown 
its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was 
· the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a 
broader view today. A promise may be lacking, and yet the 
whole writing may be 'instinct with an obligation' imperfectly 
· " (Cardozo, J., in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gor-
222 N.Y. 88, 91 [118 N.E. 214] ; Moran v. Standard Oil 
.of New York, 211 N.Y. 187, 197-198 [105 N.E. 217]; 




; Coghlan v. Stetson, 19 F. 727, 730; De Cesare v. Occh .. ··-·----···· 
"64 N.Y.S.2d 675,677; McCaU Co. v. Wright, 133 App.Div. 
~_.,·"o [117 N.Y.S. 775].) The contracts carry the inescapable 
EtnllUCliticm that the parties contemplated that the extension 
Anet rights would be secured for their mutual beneflt. 
ork law, in such cases, implies in the contract a "cove-
good faith and fair dealing," that neither party shall 
action that may destroy or impair the right of the 
. party to r"eeive the anticipated fruits of the contract. 
La Shelle Co. v Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87 
N.E. 163]; Underhill v. Schenck, 238 N.Y. 7, 15 [143 
. '.773,33 A.L.R. 303] ; Price v. Spielman Motor Sales Co., 
. . 626 [26 N.Y.S.2d 836. 839] ; Genet v. Delaw4f'6 
..... n ... n ... Canal Co., 136 N.Y. 593. 608, 611-612 {32 N.E. 
L.R.A. 1271; Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasti1lg 
.2d 373. 377; Frohman v. Pitch, 164 App.Div. 231 
633, 634j ; Goldberg, 168-05 Corp. v. LefJY, 170 
[9 N.Y.S.2d 304, 306] ; Guardino Tank Proc. Corp • 
.(."5,. _ ~ 
... ) 
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v. Ouson, 89 N.Y.S.2d 691, 696-697; Bennett tI. Vansyckel, 
4 Duer (N.Y.) 462, 472.) Nebenzal breached that implied 
covenant when he purchased and used only for his own pur-
poses rights in which both parties were given a concurrent 
interest. 
The majority opinion states that "plaintiff • . . received 
'the fruits of the contract' in the fonn of the $20,000 paid 
it by Nebenzal; so far as Nebenzal's contractual obligations 
to plaintiff are concerned Nebenzal had by ,such payment per-
fonned his part of the contract and nothin~ further remained 
to be done." That statement overlooks the fact that the reser-
vation of Quader-Kino's "unqualiflen rig-ht" to continue the 
exploitation· of its picture wa." part of the consideration in 
Addition to the $20,000 paid for the grant of the remake rights. 
Moreover, the New York coun." include as "fruits of the con· 
tract" any benefit that either party expects to derive from 
the subject of the contract when' that' expectation appeal'A 
from its tenns. Rights reserved under a contract of license 
or sale are as much the fruits of that contract &oil rights ini· 
tially created thereunder. (Manners v. Uoro.,co, 252 U.S. 
317,327 [40 S.Ct. 335, 64 L.Ed. 5901; Harper Bros. v. Klaw, 
232 F. 609, 613; Uproar Co. v. NationaZ Broadcasting Co., 
81 F.2d 373. 377.) Thus, plaintiff reserved as fruits of its 
contract with Nebenzal the unqualified right to continue the 
exploitation of "Mayerling" and the right to use the Anet 
rights for that purpose. Nebenzal impliedly covenanted not 
to do anything to impair the value of those rights. He breached 
the covenant, not when he purchased the Anet rights but 
when he used those rights to relltrnin plaintiff's exhibition of 
ita motion picture. 1 
The facts of ihis case are analogous to those of Benne#.!~ ... _._J . 
Vamyckel, supra, 4 Duel' (N.Y.) 462. Defendant therein as-
signed a lease for a tenn of years to the plaintiff. At its 
expiration, defendant obtained a new lease from the lesSor to 
the exclusion of his assignee. The court decreed that defend-
ant held the new lease as a con!!trllctive trustee for the bene-
fit of the plaintiff, on the ground that defendant breached 
his implied covenant of fair dealing by acting adversely to 
plaintUf's expectation that he would obtain a renewal of the 
lease for his own benefit. By the same reasoning, Nebenzal 
clearly breached his implied covenant not to secure and use 
adversely to plaintiff, rights that both parties contemplated 
plaintiil would attempt to secure for their mutual benefit. 
The failure of the majority opinion to adhere to the role of 
) 
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the New York cases is not justified by its statement that·" as 
found by the trial court, there is no evidence of any but fair 
and honest dealing on [Nebenzal's] part." If in fact a con-
tract has been breached, the good faith of the defendant nr his 
belief in the legal rectitude of his action is immaterial. The 
requirement of fair dealing, as the New York court has speci-
fically held, is not dependent upon the presence or· absence 
of intentional bad faith. The gravamen of a plaintUf's cause 
.of action is the fact that its contractual expectations have 
'been destroyed, and not the intention with which defendant 
:'has destroyed them. (Be'lt'ltett v. VamyckeZ,4 Duer (N.Y.) 
1462,472; Kirke La 8heUe Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 
"79,89 [188 N.E. 163] ; Harper Bros. v. KZaw, 232 F. 609, 613; 
: Ward v. Whit'ltey, 8 N.Y. 442, 446.) The converse result 
;'~reached by the majority opinion can be supported only it the 
liapplicable New York law is disregarded; that cannot be done 
view of the express provision that New York law should 
~!_,v,.'m ,. all questions relating to the construction, enforce-
and performance" of the contracts. (Boole v. U'ltUm 
IJllal,",7&8 1m. Co., 52 Cal.App. 207, 209 [198 P. 416] ; M~tuaZ 
1m. Co. v. Cohen, 179 U.S. 262, 267 [21 S.Ct. 106,45 L.Ed. 
] ; Duskin v. Pe'ltmylva'ltia-Central Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 
730; Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 216 App.Div. 362 [215 NY.S. 
189].) 
majority opinion seeks to justify its interpretation of 
contract on the ground that II 'this court will adhere to the 
Ihtetrp]~eUiLtion placed by the trial court on the writings and 
• ~nduet of the parties.'" The interpretation of a con-
or other written instrument, however, if there is no 
~1JlS1C evidence thereon or if the evidence. is without con-
and not susceptible of con1licting inferences, is a qurstion 
and the finding of the trial court thereon is not con-
on appeal. {Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 
825] ; J01I,e. v. PoUock, 34 Cal.2d 863 [215 P.2d 733] ; 
. Coal ct Mi'lting Co. v. Jones, 27 Cal.2d 819, 826-827 
P.2d 719,164 A.L.R. 685]; Union Oil Co. v. Union Sugar 
... Cal.2d 300,306 [188 P.2d 470] ; Trubowiteh v. Biv.r-
Ua1~nt11la Co., 30 Cal.2d 335, 339 [182 P.2d 182]; Bra'll' 
'(l!IJrli.,,_4ln Dairie., Inc., 4 Cal.2d 128, 133 [48 P.2d 13]; 
. 01 Norris, 78 Cal.App.2d 152, 159 [177 P.2d 299]; 
.01 O'Brien, 74 Cal.App.2d 405, 407 [168 P.2d 432] ; 
" Saving. Bank v. Costa, 83 Cal.App.2d 368, 372 
.. 778].) The only evidence the majority opinion 
) 
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invokes to support the trial court's erroneous interpretation 
is the testimony of Nebenzal that he did not want the Anl"t 
rights and that he signed the supplemental agreement under 
the impression that "it was an option, which I felt I could 
pick up or not pick up." Conceding that the trial court could 
believe Nebenzal's statement that he did not want the Anet 
rights in view of his payment of more than $10,000 for them 
six months later, I find nothing in his testimony to indicate 
that the parties gave the third clause of the agreement any 
construction other than its patent implication. The agree-
ment was in part an option, as Nebenzal stated; nonetheless 
by signing it he bound himself to its provisions, including their 
express recognition of Quader-Kino's intention to continue 
exhibiting the old picture under an extension of the ABet 
rights and the protection of its interest in those rights. Noth-
ing in the testimony casts doubt on the clear agreement in the 
main contract on Quader-Kino's reservation of rights. Finally, 
even if Nebenzal's testimony disclosed a secret intention not 
to be bouild by that agreement, that intention is irrelevant. 
"It is now a settled principle of the law of contract that the 
undisclosed intentions of the parties are . . . immaterial; 
and that the outward manifestation or expression of assent 
is controlling." (Brant v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Cal.2d 
128, 133 [48 P.2d 13] ; 1 Rest., Contracts, § 20.) . 
I would therefore reverse the judgment and remand the 
cause with directions to the trial court to grant the injunction 
as prayed and to determine the amount, if any, of damage 
suiIered by Quader-Kino as a result of Nebenzal'8 breach of 
their contract. 
